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Abstract: Studies of land property rights usually focus on tenure security and transfer rights. Rights 
to determine how to use the land are regularly ignored. However, in transition economies such as 
Vietnam and China, user rights are often limited. Relying on a unique Vietnamese panel data set at 
both household and plot level, we show that crop choice restrictions are widespread and prevent 
crop diversification. Restrictions do not decrease household income, but restricted households work 
harder, and there are indications that they are supplied with higher quality inputs. Our findings are 
consistent with the view that the Vietnamese government has managed to intervene effectively in 
agricultural (rice) production to promote output and food security. At the same time, it is now time 
to carefully consider the potential benefits of a more diversified crop pattern. 
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1. Introduction 
Twenty two years after the introduction of the Doi Moi reform process, market institutions have 
established themselves firmly in rural areas in Vietnam. Households sell their production output to 
private buyers, trade land and sell labor on the private market. Nevertheless, the state (including 
national, provincial, district, and commune authorities) retains a hugely important role in economic 
life in comparison with most non-transition economies, and even with many transition economies, 
for example in Eastern Europe. The state intervenes actively in the land market, places priority on 
rice as a crop farmers must grow, supplies many inputs in agricultural production, strongly 
dominates formal markets for financial services, and to a large extent controls a large number of 
local organizational activities. More specifically, authorities intervene heavily in farmers’ choice of 
crops, and while the land law gives households the right to sell, rent, exchange, mortgage, and 
bequeath their land, many farmers do not have the right to decide what to use their plots for. In our 
sample, around 50 percent of plots have restricted crop choice. Market reforms are very far from 
“complete”, and understanding the sustained success of Vietnam in promoting growth and poverty 
reduction is not as straightforward as often assumed. 
A range of insightful studies have analyzed the effects of the Vietnamese move 
towards privatization of agricultural land management (Do and Iyer 2008, Deininger and Jin 2008, 
Ravallion and van de Walle 2004, 2005, 2006). Yet, these studies have focused on tenure security 
and transfer rights with no attention to the importance of user rights. Econometric analysis of the 
effects of crop choice restrictions faces difficult identification challenges. The most important crop 
choice restriction in Vietnam is to compel farmers to grow. This is done to achieve production 
quotas so as to secure food supplies and meet export targets. It follows that authorities have strong 
incentives to impose restrictions on the most productive land and most productive households. This 
means that crop choice restrictions are likely to be correlated with unobserved land and household 
characteristics, which are, in turn, correlated with crop choice and land productivity. To deal 
convincingly with these problems, we use panel data at both household and plot level. We know of 
only one other study which uses a plot level panel to study land rights. Goldstein and Udry (2008) 
analyze the relationship between political power, tenure security and investment in seven 
villages/hamlets in the Akwapim region of Ghana. In contrast with their work we include plot fixed 
effects in our regressions. 
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Our results suggest that restrictions are binding in an economic sense. If they were 
lifted, many farmers would shift to other crops. A simple argument from microeconomic theory 
suggests that binding crop choice restrictions should decrease either household income, leisure or 
both. We test these hypotheses and find that restrictions do indeed have a significant effect on 
household labor supply, but no effect on income from cultivation. We also find some evidence that 
restricted households are supplied by the authorities with higher quality inputs than other 
households. Another result is that land titles have significant effects on crop choice, agricultural 
income and household labor supply in line with existing literature. 
Section 2 reviews the literature on different types of land rights, while Section 3 
discusses the history and nature of restrictions on crop choice in Vietnam. In Section 4 a simple 
microeconomic model of the effect of crop choice restrictions is formulated, and Section 5 data and 
descriptive statistics. Sections 6 and 7 investigate the effects of restrictions on crop choice and labor 
supply, while Section 8 brings out the impact on agricultural income. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Literature review1 
The right to choose which crops to grow is an important aspect of farmer property rights to land. 
However, analytical studies on the effects of land rights have focused on tenure security and 
transfer rights, such as the right to sell, rent, mortgage, and bequeath land, rather than rights 
concerning use (e.g. Feder and Onchan 1987, Place and Hazell 1993, Besley 1995, Hayes et. al. 
1997, Braselle et. al. 2002, Goldstein and Udry 2008). One reason for this focus is that use rights 
are often implied by transfer rights. For example, Braselle et al. (2004) study a region in Burkina 
Faso and report that 91.2 percent of farmers surveyed have a permanent right to choose what to 
grow on their plots, while only about 25 percent have the right to rent or give away the plot. Sales 
are never allowed, and it is virtually never the case that a farmer has the right to transfer a plot, but 
not the right to choose what to grow.  
In contrast, in Vietnam and other transition economies the situation is very different. 
Brandt et al. (2002) report that in 25 percent of the villages they surveyed in rural China, villagers 
cannot freely determine what to grow. In addition, 80 to 90 percent of all plots are held as 
“responsibility land”, which implies that households are obliged to deliver set quotas of grain or 
other specified crops to the commune. Hence, farmers are forced to grow these crops on at least 
some of their land. In our sample, around 74 percent of plots owned and operated by households are 
                                                 
1
 For general surveys of the literature on land rights and other policies related to land, see Feder and Nishio (1999), 
Deininger and Feder (2001), Deininger (2003) and Pande and Udry (2005). 
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held with a title, a so-called Land Use Certificate (LUC).
2
 LUCs grant 20 year tenure security for 
annual crops land (50 years for perennial crops land) and a wide range of transfer rights, but not the 
right to determine use. 
Most studies of land rights in Vietnam analyze the effects of land use certificates, and 
focus on tenure security and transfer rights rather than use rights. Deininger and Jin (2008) study 
the effects of the land market. They find that LUCs facilitate participation in land rental and sales 
markets, and that these markets in turn work to transfer land from large to small farms, and from 
less to more skilled farmers. Ravallion and van de Walle (2006) find that land market transactions 
have worked to decrease inefficiencies brought about by the administrative allocation of agricultural 
land following de-collectivization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They do not directly study the 
effects of land rights, but to the extent that land market activities are facilitated by formal transfer 
rights, their study implies a positive effect of such rights. Do and Iyer (2008) combine province 
level data on the progress of land titling with household level data from the 1993 and 1998 Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSS) to study the effects of LUCs. They conclude that 
rights have a statistically significant, but economically moderate effect on investment in perennial 
crops, and on hours of work in non-agriculture.  
The descriptive report by Brandt et al. (2005), based on the 2004 VHLSS, contains 
statistics on the prevalence of LUCs and presents descriptive regressions on land prices. They show 
that a LUC is associated with a price increase of approximately 23 percent. No statistics are 
reported on restricted crop choice, since data on restrictions are not collected in the VHLSS. An 
early study by Pingali and Xuan (1992) investigated the effect of the change from collective 
farming to “contract farming” implemented in 1981. In the new system farmers were individually 
responsible for delivering a quota of rice or other crops to the commune, and were entitled to keep 
any surplus above the quota for own consumption or sale. Hence, the policy change improved 
farmers’ property rights to the harvested crop and this increased productivity.  
Finally, the present paper is to our knowledge, the first analysis of the effects of 
restrictions on crop choice in Vietnam. In fact, we are not aware of any studies focusing on this 
issue in transition economies.  
 
                                                 
2
 Somewhat ironically for a document that assigns private property rights in a communist country, LUCs are also known 
as “red books”. 
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3. History and nature of state intervention in land use management
3
  
Many policy areas in Vietnam have been characterized by a gradual process of liberalization since 
the beginning of the Doi Moi reform program in 1986. Policies on agricultural land use are in some 
respects an exception. The important Resolution no. 10 in 1988 and the 1993 Land Law nominally 
granted farmers the right to decide what to grow. As the land law was implemented, however, it was 
hotly debated whether farmers in rice growing areas should be allowed to shift to other crops; and 
the 1998 and 2001 revisions to the land law clarify that changes in land use purpose are only 
allowed “within the existing physical planning framework adopted by central and local 
governments” (Vasavakul 2006, p. 226). The formal justification for state intervention is now found 
in the 2003 Land Law (for example article 11, §1 and article 36). Restrictions are administered by 
commune authorities, according to the commune land use plan. The plan is produced by commune 
authorities, subject to approval at district level. Formally, households can apply for a change in land 
use purpose at the district level but in practice it is very difficult for farmers to change or remove 
restrictions on their plots.
4
 At each administrative level, land use plans must be consistent with 
plans at higher levels (from the commune to the district, the province and national plan). Hence, 
flexibility in relation to land use is limited.  
 Table 1 presents administrative, national level data on the extent of land use 
restrictions in different regions of Vietnam. 
 
Table 1 Land restricted for rice production, regional and 
national level (2006)  
(percent of all land for crop agriculture) 
North East and North West 17.9 
Red river delta 74.9 
North Central Coast 40.0 
South Central Coast 23.4 
Central Highlands 4.9 
South East 9.6 
Mekong river delta 68.3 
  Vietnam 35.3 
Source: data compiled by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
(MONRE) based on the detailed 2006 National Land Use Plan. 
 
                                                 
3
 For in-depth descriptions of land policies in Vietnam, see Kerkvliet (2006) and Marsh, MacAuley and Hung (2006). 
4
 This is based on extensive of a qualitative nature (including in-depth discussion with officials at national level in 
CIEM, ILSSA, IPSARD and MONRE, and observations made during repeated field trips by the authors over the past 
seven years. 
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The table shows that farmers are obliged to grow rice on 35 percent of the total land area used for 
crop agriculture. Restrictions are concentrated in the two deltas of the Mekong and Red River. 
Since land in the deltas is considerably more productive land than in the uplands and population 
densities are much higher, the importance of restrictions in terms of the number of farmers affected 
is much higher than 35 percent. As demonstrated in Table 2 in Section 5, the obligation to grow rice 
is the overwhelmingly dominant type of restriction, but other restrictions apply as well. 
Why does the state impose restrictions on land use? In a sense, it is not surprising that 
the government of Vietnam makes use of centralized planning. Still, we may ask why an 
administration which has liberalized in many other fields has chosen to maintain restrictions on land 
use. Originally, the overriding concern was food security. In the early 1980s, Vietnam experienced 
severe food shortages, and these events continued to affect agricultural policies after the initiation 
of the Doi Moi reforms in 1986. Food security remains a major motive behind restrictions, but 
export targets are playing an increasing role. For example, the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment’s Five Year Socioeconomic Development Plan (SDP) (p. 64) states that Vietnam should 
export 3 to 4 million tons of food crop products per year over the period 2006-2010. One method 
for reaching this goal is to restrict farmers to growing rice, the most important food export.  
The fact that one of the reasons for imposing restrictions is to meet certain production 
targets means that the government (national and local) has an incentive to impose restrictions on the 
highest quality land, and the most effective producers, in order to maximize the probability that 
targets are met. Other reasons for restricting land use mentioned by Vietnamese officials include 
“the fact that local violations [of land use restrictions] may environmentally damage the areas 
developed for rice growing; that in some areas farmers are not equipped to grow anything other than 
rice; and that the state has already invested heavily in irrigating rice land” (Vasavakul 2006, p. 227).  
Finally, anecdotal evidence exists on disputes over land use between farmers and 
authorities. In the south, conflicts have occurred because farmers were prevented from converting 
rice fields into shrimp raising farms. In the Red River delta, conflicts are reported to have taken 
place because farmers were not allowed to grow fruit trees instead of rice (Vasavakul 2006, p. 227).  
 
4. Theory 
We now go on to sketch a simple microeconomic model to illustrate how restrictions on crop choice 
may affect household behavior. Consider a farm household who maximizes the following utility 
function: 
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U C X   (1) 
 
where C is consumption, and X leisure. Assume that the household commands time resources 
normalized to 1 and operates an agricultural land area of size Q . The household grows two 
different crops, denoted 1 and 2. The prices received by the household for the crops are denoted p1 
and p2, respectively. The income of the household is given by: 
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2( , ) ( , )I p f L Q p f L Q   (2) 
 
where f1 and f2 are the production function for crop 1 and crop 2, respectively. Assume that both 
production functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Also, assume that consumption simply 
equals income. The household then maximizes: 
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2( , ) ( , ) 1U p f L Q p f L Q Q L L     
   
(3) 
 
Denote the solution to this problem by ( * * *1 2 1, ,L L Q ), and assume that the government imposes the 
restriction that the household must grow crop 1 on an area equal to at least 1
rQ . If 1
rQ  is higher than 
the desired area for crop 1, *1Q , we say that the restriction is binding. The effect of imposing a 
binding restriction can be illustrated in a diagram such as Figure 1. The figure shows income as a 
function of leisure (or equivalently, of labor supply). The schedule PP is the income function in the 
case without restrictions, and the schedule PPr is the income function after a binding restriction has 
been imposed. U and Ur are simple, linear indifference curves.  
 
Figure 1 The effect of a crop choice restriction on leisure and income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leisure (X) 
Income (I) 
U 
Ur 
PP 
PPr 
A 
B 
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The optimal solution for the household is point A before the restriction is imposed, and point B 
after. The restriction in this case increases both labor supply and income. For other parameter 
values, income might drop as a result of restrictions. The only outcome which is entirely ruled out is 
a simultaneous increase in both leisure and income. This argument motivates our analysis of the 
impact of crop choice restrictions on income and labor supply in Sections 7 and 8.  
5. Data and descriptive statistics 
We make use of a unique household and plot level panel data set collected in the Vietnam Access to 
Resources Household Survey (VARHS). The surveys were implemented in 12 provinces in 
Vietnam between July and September 2006 and July and September 2008. It re-interviewed 
households sampled for the income and expenditure modules of the 2002 and 2004 VHLSS in the 
12 provinces.
5
 Provinces were selected to facilitate the use of the survey as an evaluation tool for 
Danida supported programs in Vietnam. Seven of the 12 provinces are covered by the Danida 
business sector support program (BSPS), and five provinces are covered by the agricultural and 
rural development (ARD) program. The provinces supported by the agricultural support program 
are located in the North West and Central Highlands, so these relatively poor and sparsely 
populated regions are over-sampled. Our sample is statistically representative at the provincial but 
not at the national level.  
The 2006 round of the VARHS survey covered 2,324 households in 466 communes. 
Out of these households, 2,271 were identified and re-surveyed in 2008 (implying an attrition rate 
of seven percent). We analyze the 2,049 of these households, who operate a farm, grow crops, and 
have data on key variables. The household survey collected detailed plot-level information on 
property rights (including restrictions on use), land use, irrigation, mode and time of acquisition, 
and other plot characteristics. It also provides detailed information at the household level on 
agricultural inputs, outputs and investment in addition to general information about individuals and 
households. 
 While household level panel data has become relatively common, it is unusual that 
economic surveys collect panel data at the plot level. In the 2006 round of the survey, enumerators 
sketched a “map of plots” for each household. It indicates the approximate location of each 
household plots in relation to the family home, and also includes information on the size of the plot, 
                                                 
5
 See CIEM et al. (2007, 2009) for further background information and details. The sampled provinces are, by region: 
Red River Delta: Ha Tay. North East: Lao Cai, Phu Tho. North West: Lai Chau, Dien Bien. North Central Coast: Nghe 
Anh. South Central Coast: Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa. Central Highlands: Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lam Dong. Mekong 
River Delta: Long An. 
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the distance from the family home, and the code assigned to the plot, according to the coding 
system detailed in the questionnaire and enumerators’ manual. Appendix 1 shows one of the maps 
collected. These maps were stored, and copies were taken back to households in 2008 and used to 
identify plots. A total of 12,511 plots were included in the 2006 survey for the households who 
were re-interviewed in 2008, and 9,432 of these plots were identified again in 2008. Households 
stated that they parted with a total of 861 plots, and if plots had been split up, or merged with other 
plots, they were regarded as “new” plots. Some 1,865 plots were classified to have changed in these 
two ways. An additional 353 plots (three percent of the original sample) were not re-surveyed for a 
variety of reasons.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the plots and households analyzed. The first 
line shows restrictions on crop choice are common, and a drop occurred between 2006 and 2008. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
(means, unless otherwise specified) 
 
 
Variable 2006 2008 
Observations 
(total) 
Plot level^   
 Crop choice restricted 0.52 0.45* 16,520 
Must grow rice 0.48 0.41* 16,520 
Has red book (title) 0.74 0.73 16,698 
Planted with rice 0.65 0.62 15,879 
Irrigated 0.68 0.68 16,698 
Rented 0.05 0.05 16,698 
Household level 
   
Household size 4.7 4.6 4,029 
Age of household head 50.1 51.5* 4,028 
Female household head 0.19 0.20* 4,029 
Income from crop 
agriculture, '000 VND 
(2006 RRD prices, 
median)^^ 
3,900 5,819* 3,894 
Operated ag. area, sqm. 
(median)  
3,500 3,309 4,030 
Labor supply per working 
hh member, days in last 
12 months 
175 177 4,009 
Labor input in crop 
agriculture per working 
hh member, days in last 
12 months 
57 61* 4,009 
^Only plots where crops are grown are included. 
^^Income is adjusted for regional differences in price levels, and for region specific inflation. 
The base is prices in rural areas of the Red River Delta in 2006 (the 2006 baseline is calculated 
from Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2006, and region-specific inflation 
from July 2006 to July 2008 is calculated on the basis of data provided by the General Statistics 
Office (GSO). The income- and farm size variables are quite strongly skewed to the right, so 
medians are more informative than means. * denotes that the difference between 2006 and 2008 
is significant at the 5 percent level. 
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This stems partly from the general trend towards increased influence of market forces, and partly 
from the fact that high rice prices in 2008 rendered restrictions less necessary in some areas, in the 
sense that the high prices meant that rice became a more attractive crop. Next, the table documents 
that by far the most common restriction is that farmers must grow rice. The table also shows that 
most plots are titled and that the share of plots titled remained stable between 2006 and 2008. The 
share of plots planted with rice has decreased slightly, while the share irrigated and the share which 
is rented is the same in the two survey years.  
 At the household level, household size and the share of household heads, which are 
female are unchanged, while household heads, not surprisingly, are older in 2006 than in 2008. Real 
income from crop agriculture increased very substantially. This is mostly a reflection of the very 
large increases in world market prices of crops over the period. Farm sizes decrease moderately 
over the period, reflecting continuous subdivision of farms, as parents hand over land to their 
children. Household labor supply increased marginally, especially in crop agriculture, in line with 
increased monetary returns. 
6. Crop choice 
In our econometric analysis, we first investigate whether restrictions do in fact impose binding 
constraints on farmers. Would they grow something else if they were not subject to restrictions? 
Most restrictions compel farmers to grow rice, but obviously many would plant rice even in the 
absence of restrictions. Natural conditions in most areas of Vietnam are very well suited to rice 
cultivation. If restrictions are binding in an economic sense, there should be a significant, partial 
correlation between restriction status and the decision to grow rice, even when household and plot 
characteristics are controlled for.  
We proceed assuming that the determination of crop choice can be described by the 
following model: 
 
 
'pht pht pht h ph phtC R x u v e        , (4) 
 
where phtC  is crop choice on plot p in household h in year t. The variable takes the value one if the 
plot is planted with rice in at least one season in year t, and zero otherwise. phtR  is a dummy 
indicating whether there is a restriction on the plot specifying that rice must be grown; phtx  is a 
vector of potentially time-varying variables that may affect crop choice; hu  is an unobserved, 
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household specific effect and phv
 
is an unobserved, plot-specific effect; and phte  is an idiosyncratic, 
time varying error term. Conditional on the unobserved, fixed effects, phte  is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, and α, β and γ are parameters to be estimated.  
In this model, the introduction of household fixed effects in a regression would 
remove the bias stemming from 
hu , but not the bias from phv . It is eminently plausible that 
unobserved plot characteristics, such as the quality and nature of the soil, play a significant role for 
the choice of crop. At the same time, these characteristics are correlated with the imposition of 
restrictions. Authorities have, as already alluded, a significant incentive to choose restrictions in 
such a way as to maximize rice production. Introducing fixed effects at the plot level removes the 
bias from unobserved plot characteristics which are fixed over time. Since this is likely to be more 
or less true for variables such as the type and quality of soil, the possibility to include plot fixed 
effects due to the nature of our data is a significant benefit. 
Results are shown in Table 3, and the first column shows a strong, and highly 
statistically significant, partial correlation between restrictions and crop choice. The probability of 
growing rice is predicted to increase by 14 percentage points when a restriction is imposed. Column 
two shows that this effect is only slightly lower (12 percentage points) when controls for potentially 
time-varying plot characteristics are included. 
 
Table 3 Crop choice regressions with plot FE, 2006-
2008 
 Must grow rice 0.144 0.123 
 
 
(18.89)*** (16.56)*** 
 Red book 
 
0.041 
 
  
(3.79)*** 
 Irrigated 
 
0.212 
 
  
(24.55)*** 
 Year = 2008 
 
0.015 
 
  
(3.71)*** 
 Constant 0.572 0.395 
 
 
(144.05)*** (37.08)*** 
 Fixed effects Plot Plot 
 
    No. Plots 7,284 7,283 
 Note: Dependent variable is “plot planted with rice in at least one 
season” and absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Unsurprisingly, the availability of irrigation has a strong positive effect on the 
probability of growing rice. This variable might be endogenous in the sense that the decision to 
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invest in irrigation may follow the decision to grow rice, rather than the other way around. Note, 
however, that investment in irrigation facilities is in Vietnam generally undertaken by local 
authorities, rather than by households. We therefore believe it is reasonable to assume that the 
availability of irrigation is exogenous.  
The probability of growing rice increases when the household receives a title for a 
plot. This may appear to be at variance with Do and Iyer (2008) who found that land titles increase 
investment in perennial crops. Yet, the apparent contradiction disappears when it is recalled that 
initiating rice production also entails investment costs.
6
 Controlling for plot characteristics, 
households are more likely to grow rice in 2008 than in 2006. Again, this no doubt reflects the 
strong increase in the price of rice over the period. 
 In sum, changes in restriction status are very strongly correlated with changes in crop 
choice, even when observed and unobserved plot characteristics are controlled for. This is a clear 
indication that formal restrictions do in fact affect household behavior. Another piece of evidence 
pointing in this direction is provided in Table 4. In VARHS 2008, respondents were asked for each 
plot they had planted, why they had chosen the crop they grew in the most recent season.  
 
Table 4 Stated reasons for crop choice, 2008 (percent) 
 
Reason All plots 
Plots with restricted crop 
choice 
Obliged by commune authorities 37.3 80.4 
High productivity/high efficiency 40.5 12.0 
Plot not suitable for other crops 16.7 6.5 
Other 5.5 1.2 
N=7,672 
   
The results show that for 37 percent of all plots, farmers state that the main reason for 
growing the crop they grow is that they are “obliged by authorities”. Some 41 percent say that the 
crop has high productivity or high efficiency, and 17 percent say that the plot is not suitable for 
other crops. On plots where an objective, formal crop choice restriction is present (column two), 
respondents on 80 percent of the plots say that the obligation toward the authorities is the most 
important reason for their choice of crop. While this does not imply that farmers would shift to 
another crop if restrictions were lifted in 80 percent of the cases, the fact that a large share of 
                                                 
6
 Land titles, and transfer rights in general, are typically regarded as endogenous in the literature (e.g. Besley 1995, 
Braselle et. al. 2004, Markussen 2008). However, since a main source of endogeneity is unobserved household and land 
characteristics (such as entrepreneurship and soil quality), it is plausible that land titles are exogenous in the plot fixed 
effects model, where these factors are controlled, in contrast with the cross-section models typically estimated 
(including an earlier draft of this paper based on the 2006 data only). 
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respondents answer that the obligation is the most important reason for their crop choice strengthens 
the finding that restrictions affect behavior. 
7. Household labor supply 
The simple microeconomic argument illustrated in Figure 1 suggests that if crop choice restrictions 
are binding, they are likely to have an effect on household income and labor supply. We therefore 
turn to an investigation hereof. Since labor input and income from crop agriculture are not available 
at the plot level, these analyses are conducted at the household level. 
We first consider labor supply. Table 5 presents the results of estimating household 
fixed effects regressions for household labor supply per working household member. The first two 
columns explain labor input in crop agriculture and the last two total household labor supply (in 
logs). The measure of crop choice restrictions used is the share of agricultural land subject to a 
restriction. A year dummy is included in all regressions. In columns two and four, a number of other 
control variables are also included. First, the share of land with a red book is introduced. If land 
titles increase investment, they may also affect labor supply, depending on whether these 
investments are labor-saving or labor-using (see Do and Iyer 2008). The size of operated 
agricultural area (“farm size”) is also included, since land and labor are complementary inputs in 
agricultural production. Finally, total household size in logs is included, and all models account for 
household fixed effects. These play an important role by helping remove the effect of unobserved 
household preferences for leisure. Local authorities in Vietnam may be able to observe at least some 
of these preferences, and since they have an incentive to impose restrictions on the most hard-
working households, this strengthens our analysis. 
Results show a significant, positive effect of restrictions on labor supply, both for crop 
agriculture and for all activities. Such an effect appears plausible. Rice cultivation requires higher 
labor inputs per hectare than most other crops. For example, in 2008 households who grew only rice 
put in a total of 717 days of labor per hectare per year in crop agriculture, whereas households 
growing no rice supplied 494 days per hectare per year. As we have seen, restrictions increase the 
probability of growing rice. 
It is somewhat surprising that the effect on labor input in agriculture is not 
significantly stronger than on total labor supply. One would expect the effect of restrictions to work 
mainly through crop agriculture. One possible explanation is that attenuation bias is stronger for 
labor input in crop agriculture than for total labor supply. First, total labor supply is likely to be 
measured with less error than labor supply in any particular sector (since errors for different sectors 
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to some extent cancel out in the aggregate). Second, labor input in agriculture is particularly 
difficult to measure, inter alia because the number of hours worked per day often varies strongly 
over the year. 
 
Table 5 Restrictions and labor supply, household fixed effects 
  
 
Dependent variable 
  
Hh labor supply in crop 
agriculture per working 
household member, log 
Total hh labor supply per 
working household 
member, log 
Share of land with restrictions 0.100 0.119 0.106 0.112 
 
(2.25)** (2.73)*** (3.42)*** (3.60)*** 
Share of land with red book 
 
-0.074 
 
0.103 
  
-1.39 
 
(2.71)*** 
Farm size in sqm, log 
 
0.247 
 
0.075 
  
(7.15)*** 
 
(3.11)*** 
HH size, log 
 
-0.516 
 
-0.003 
  
(6.33)*** 
 
-0.05 
year_2008 0.068 0.065 -0.006 0 
 
(3.29)*** (3.18)*** -0.45 -0.02 
Constant 3.709 2.465 5.006 4.314 
 
(150.38)*** (8.11)*** (295.69)*** (20.43)*** 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 3907 3906 4004 4003 
Number of household 2103 2103 2138 2138 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
The results also show that the share of land held with a title has an insignificant, 
negative effect on labor input in crop agriculture, but a positive effect on total labor supply. This is 
consistent with the results reported in Do and Iyer (2008), who found that land titles in Vietnam 
increase labor input in non-farm activities. Increases in total household size are estimated to 
decrease labor input per worker in crop agriculture. This indicates that total household labor input in 
agriculture does not increase proportionally with household size. As the household size increases, 
members share the workload in agriculture, and each works less. On the other hand, household size 
has no effect on total labor supply per worker. Controlling for other factors, households tend to 
work harder in crop agriculture in 2008 than in 2006. Since year does not have an effect on total 
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labor supply, this indicates that households have shifted labor resources from other sectors into crop 
agriculture, consistent with higher crop prices.  
 In sum, crop choice restrictions increase labor input per worker, both in crop 
agriculture and on aggregate. This is consistent with the observation that rice cultivation requires 
relatively high labor inputs. 
8. Income from crop agriculture 
We now turn to the econometric analysis of restrictions and household income from crop 
agriculture. Table 6 presents regressions for income from crop agriculture, in logs. Income is 
defined as the value of output minus the value of all purchased, variable inputs, and all inputs are 
assumed to be purchased, except for “self-provided fertilizers”. The measure of restrictions used is, 
again, the share of operated area with restrictions. All specifications include a household fixed 
effect and a year-dummy. Column two includes land and household characteristics that may 
plausibly vary over time. These are the share of land with a title, farm size, household labor input in 
crop agriculture, the share of irrigated land, and the share of rented land. In addition, column three 
introduces land characteristics which are, by and large, time-invariant at the plot level. Since the 
household might acquire or part with land, however, these characteristics may in principle change at 
the household level, and these changes may be correlated with restrictions and with income. We 
include the share of land with slight, medium, and steep slope (leaving out the share with a flat 
slope as the residual category), and have an additional measure of land quality. This is the share of 
land that falls in each of four tax brackets.
7
 
Results show that restrictions have a statistically insignificant, positive effect on 
income from crop agriculture. Hence, restrictions do not seem to make households poorer, although, 
as illustrated in Figure 1, the increased labor efforts they induce might still mean that restrictions 
                                                 
7
 Following the 1993 Land Law, most plots in Vietnam were, as described by Le (undated), classified for tax purposes. 
For annual crops land, six categories were defined. For perennial crops land there were five categories. Classification 
depended on five objective plot characteristics, soil quality, location (i.e. distance from residence), terrain (e.g. slope), 
climate, and irrigation conditions. Higher taxes were due for land in a better category (category one is best). Based on 
the tax-classification information, we created a unified measure of land quality applying to both annual and perennial 
crops land. The classification schemes for annual- and perennial land are unified based on the tax rates for each 
category of land. Hence, in each of the four land quality “classes” we define, approximately the same amount of tax was 
due for all plots. The four classes on the land quality variable relate to the tax classification scheme in the following 
way:  
Class 1: Category 1 of annual land and category 1 and 2 of perennial land. Tax rates: 550-650 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 2: Category 2 and 3 of annual land and category 3 of perennial land. Tax rates: 370-460 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 3: Category 4 and 5 of annual land and category 4 of perennial land. Tax rates: 180-280 kg rice/ha/year 
Class 4: Category 6 of annual land and category 5 of perennial land. Tax rates: 50-80 kg rice/ha/year. 
Since the tax-related land-classifications have not been updated since the 1990s, as a result of the land tax being 
abandoned in 2003, the variable is in our analysis fixed at the plot level from 2006 to 2008. 
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reduce welfare. Another interesting result from the table is the finding that land titles have a 
significant, positive effect on income. As already alluded to, land rights are often viewed as 
endogenous. However, since a major, potential source of endogeneity is unobserved household- and 
land characteristics, this is much less of a concern in household fixed effects models than in cross-
section analyses. The positive effect contrasts with the results in Do and Iyer (2008), who do not 
find a positive effect of land titles on income or restrictions. 
 
Table 6 Restrictions and income, household fixed effects 
 Share of land with restrictions 0.022 0.052 0.061 
 
-(0.47) -(1.16) -(1.37) 
Share of land with red book 
 
0.097 0.103 
  
(1.68)* (1.77)* 
Farmsize in sqm, log 
 
0.48 0.475 
  
(12.44)*** (12.14)*** 
Household labor input in crop production, log 0.179 0.182 
  
(7.04)*** (7.13)*** 
Share of land irrigated 
 
0.032 0.019 
  
-0.55 -0.32 
Share of land rented in 
 
0.102 0.114 
  
-0.75 -0.84 
Year = 2008 0.347 0.348 0.327 
 
(15.74)*** (16.67)*** (13.90)*** 
Share of land with slight slope 
  
-0.056 
   
-1.04 
Share of land with medium slope 
  
-0.025 
   
-0.32 
Share of land with steep slope 
  
-0.019 
   
-0.14 
Share of land class 2 
  
-0.001 
   
-0.02 
Share of land class 3 
  
-0.115 
   
-1.45 
Share of land class 4 
  
-0.03 
   
-0.27 
Share of land with unknown category/class 
 
0.079 
   
-1.18 
Age of head 
  
-0.002 
   
-0.41 
Female hh head 
  
0.018 
   
-0.16 
Constant 8.29 3.341 3.473 
 
(314.00)*** (10.09)*** (8.72)*** 
Household fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    Observations 3768 3768 3765 
Number of household 2049 2049 2049 
Note: The dependent variable is Income from crop production, log, and absolute value of t 
statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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It might be unexpected that land titles have a positive effect on income already in the 
same period as they are acquired. After all, the channel of causation most usually assumed to 
transmit an effect from property rights to income operates through increased investment. 
Investments take time to complete, and will often only yield a return after some time. However, at 
least one plausible explanation for a same-period effect exists in the case of Vietnam. The state-
sponsored Vietnam Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (VBARD), which plays a large 
role in rural credit provision, provides loans only to households who can offer titled land as 
collateral. Borrowing from VBARD is common, and loans are often used to buy current inputs in 
crop production, such as seeds, saplings or fertilizers (field observations). Hence, a same-period 
effect of land titles on income is likely to be transmitted through the credit channel. 
 As we would expect from Table 2, there is a large, positive year-effect. Income from 
crop agriculture is more than 30 percent higher in 2008 than in 2006. Farm size and labor input 
have the expected signs and are highly significant. The share of land irrigated does not have a 
significant effect on income. This might indicate that Vietnamese irrigation systems are ineffective, 
but it is more likely a result of the fact that this variable does not vary much over time. 
 Estimated coefficients on the slope and land class variables are all insignificantly 
different from zero. We take this as an indication that the household fixed effects do a good job of 
controlling for land characteristics. 
 The fact that the restrictions variable remains positive even after controls for labor 
input have been introduced (in columns 2 and 3) is not what one would have expected from Figure 
1. It implies that for a given level of labor supply, restrictions should lead to a decrease in income. 
One might argue that since the estimated coefficients on restrictions are not significantly different 
from zero, the theoretical prediction and our findings are reconcilable; but the fact the coefficient is 
positive does suggest that it is relevant to ponder further about the full story behind the data. 
There are at least two different explanations for the absent, negative effect of 
restrictions on income. First, restrictions may be beneficial if they solve coordination problems. For 
example, the yield of rice might be lower if the crop grows in the shadow of tree crops. The use of 
rice fields for shrimp production might lead to salinization of the soil, making it unsuitable for crop 
production. Cross-pollination between different varieties of crops could also present collective 
action problems. If restrictions do solve such problems, it implies that they have positive 
externalities. If they do, a household should in theory experience a positive effect of restrictions on 
other farms in their neighborhood.  
 18 
We tested this hypothesis by calculating the average share of land with restrictions 
among all sampled households in a commune and including this variable in regression 3 in the 
model in Table 6. This did not change the sign on the variable measuring the household own 
restrictions. Instead, the commune-average variable entered with the wrong sign (negative), 
although insignificantly different from zero.  
Second, restrictions tend to come with certain benefits from the authorities, such as 
increased access to extension services, irrigation water or price subsidies. We therefore investigate 
the importance of such effects. Since some key variables used in these analyses (in particular, 
fertilizer prices and plot level information about the use of high-quality rice seed) were only 
measured in 2006, we rely here on the sample from that year only.  
Consider prices first. The vast majority of households sell their output to private 
traders, so it is implausible that households with restrictions are given subsidies on their output 
prices. How about input prices?  
Table 7 presents results of regression models explaining the unit price paid by each 
household for chemical fertilizers, which is an important, purchased input.
8
 The regressions include 
commune fixed effects. 
 
Table 7. Restrictions and the price of chemical fertilizers  
 OLS OLS 
Share of land with restrictions -0.042 0.004 
 (1.52) (0.16) 
Amount of fertilizer purchased, log  -0.104 
  (11.28)*** 
Constant 1.275 1.83 
 (82.35)*** (35.67)*** 
Fixed effects Commune Commune 
   
Observations 1,647 1,647 
R-squared 0.55 0.59 
Note: the dependent variable is the unit price of chemical fertilizers, log. Observations with reported prices of fertilizer less than 1,000 VND pr kg are 
deemed unrealistic and were set as missing. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The first column in Table 7 shows that, controlling for commune characteristics, restrictions are 
indeed associated with a lower unit price of fertilizer. However, once the amount of fertilizer 
purchased is controlled for (in column 2) this effect disappears. It seems that households simply get 
                                                 
8
 651 households did not report fertilizer prices. 21 households were excluded because they reported prices below 1000 
VND per kg., which was deemed unrealistically low. The results do not change substantially if they are included. 
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a quantity discount (prices drop by 10 percent when the purchased amount doubles), and that 
households under restrictions use more fertilizer than others. Hence, the results do not support the 
hypothesis that restricted households are subsidized. 
Table 8 shows the effect of restrictions on access to extension services and irrigation 
in OLS regressions with commune fixed effects. The share of land with restricted crop choice is not 
positively related to the probability of using extension services. In contrast, restricted farms are 
much more likely to have access to irrigation. In particular, they are more likely to use public or 
cooperative irrigation infrastructure. This might be the result of either (i) a higher tendency for 
irrigated plots to be put under restrictions, or (ii) a higher willingness on part of the authorities to 
supply irrigation water to restricted plots. Note, however, that access to irrigation is already 
controlled for in the income regressions. 
 
Table 8 Restriction and use extension services and irrigation 
 Dependent variable 
 
Hh used extension 
services in last 12 
months=1 
Share of land 
irrigated 
Hh dependent on 
public or 
cooperative 
irrigation=1 
Share of land with restrictions -0.03 0.171 0.187 
 (0.86) (8.46)*** (8.12)*** 
Constant 0.425 0.59 0.552 
 (23.05)*** (55.37)*** (45.63)*** 
Fixed effects Commune Commune Commune 
    
Observations 2081 2081 2081 
R-squared 0.38 0.65 0.72 
Note: All models are estimated with OLS.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Finally, an important determinant of rice yields is the type of seeds used. In particular, 
the introduction of “hybrid” seeds is a key important factor behind the improvement of rice yields 
experienced in Vietnam over recent decades. Substantial investments and government effort have 
gone into promoting breeding, multiplication and extension of good quality seed of high yielding 
varieties.  
Table 9 shows the effects of restrictions on the probability that a plot is sown with 
hybrid seeds in at least one season in the last 12 months, using OLS regressions at the plot level 
with household fixed effects. The regressions only include plots sown with rice in at least some 
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seasons. The measure of restrictions used is an indicator for the restriction that the plot must be 
sown with rice in at least some seasons. Results show that restricted plots are more likely to be 
sown with hybrid seeds than other plots. This indicates that better seeds are supplied to restricted 
plots than to other plots, either because authorities favor these plots or because restricted plots are 
more likely to be endowed with characteristics necessary for successful use of hybrid seeds, such as 
irrigation. 
 
Table 9 Restrictions, hybrid seeds and the number of cropping seasons 
Must grow rice in at least some seasons 0.077 0.076  
 (5.15)*** (5.18)***  
Number of rice harvests in last 12 months  0.085  
  (9.15)***  
Constant 0.297 0.144  
 (45.58)*** (8.07)***  
Fixed effects Household Household  
    
Observations 6,205 6,205  
R-squared 0.92 0.92  
Note: The dependent variable is whether the household used hybrid seeds in at least one season in the last 
12 months All models are estimated with OLS. Only plots planted with rice in at least some seasons are 
included. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
In sum, the evidence indicates that restricted households do not obtain better prices of 
fertilizer or better access to extension services. However, restricted plots are more likely to be 
irrigated and to be sown with hybrid seeds than on plots. Hence, we do find indications that 
restricted plots are supplied with better inputs than other plots in line with officially declared 
government policy.  
9. Conclusion 
Vietnam is an intriguing case of economic development. Wide-ranging market oriented reforms 
have been coupled with robust economic growth and poverty reduction over the past two decades. 
At the same time, the state has retained a strong and interventionist stance in many aspects of 
economic and social life and organization. Vietnam defies simplistic categorization, and much 
remains to be learnt about the causes of success. This paper has demonstrated that restrictions on 
crop choice are common and widespread in Vietnamese agriculture in spite of recent reforms. We 
have also shown that restrictions impose real constraints on the behavior of farmers. When they are 
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lifted, a significant share of farmers changes their choice of crop. Restrictions have also had a 
significant effect on household labor supply, but no effect on income from cultivation was found. 
There is some evidence as to why standard predictions fails to emerge as restricted households are 
supplied (compensated) by the authorities with higher quality inputs than other households in 
accordance with officially declared policy. Another result – in line with previous literature – is that 
land titles have significant effects on crop choice, agricultural income and household labor supply.  
Our results confirm that land use restrictions should not be ignored in analyses of land 
policies in Vietnam and other transition economies, most notably China, where restrictions on crop 
choice are common. In these economies, the tendency in the literature to focus on transfer rights 
instead of use rights should be re-considered. From a methodological perspective we have 
demonstrated the advantages of using panel data at both household and plot level in studies of land 
property rights. 
Turning to policy implications, the Vietnamese government would appear to have 
managed to combine market reforms with strong and effective intervention in agricultural 
production for food security and export promotion purposes. Thus our results do not provide a basis 
for recommending dismantling of state intervention in Vietnamese agriculture. They do, however, 
suggest that it may be time to consider carefully the potential benefits of a more diversified crop 
pattern and whether the present system of land use planning remains the most efficient Vietnam 
could have. At a point in time where the country produces a large surplus of rice and transport 
infrastructure is becoming increasingly developed, concerns about food security are maybe less of a 
challenge than in the past. Restrictions that compel farmers to growing rice do tie up significant 
labor resources in low-value added agriculture. As Vietnam continues to develop at a rapid pace, 
human resources may well be put to better use in the production of higher-value added agricultural 
crops and work in non-farm activities.  
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Appendix: Example of plot map 
 
